Personal Ethical Philosophy

April 29, 2024
April 29, 2024
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Personal Ethical Philosophy

My ethical philosophy is that I have to aspire on being good as much as I can. This means being good objectively and not subjectively. The aspect comes about because I believe in treating other people fairly, and I usually expect the same thing in return. I try my best not to be selfish at the expense of others. This philosophy is created from Kantian ethics. Kant’s theory asserts that the wrongness or goodness of actions should not depend on the likely consequences but dwell more on whether the actions fulfill our duty (Cholbi, 2016). Actions such as theft and murder ought to be completely prohibited even in instances where the action is likely to bring more happiness compared to the alternative.

Going with the Ring of Gyges case, my personal ethical philosophy would deter me from acting in a way that would harm the king. This is because a person is bad or good, depending on the motivation that drives their actions and not the goodness of the likely consequences (Cholbi, 2016). I am motivated by being good objectively and ensuring that I do not lead a selfish life. As a result, I would not use the power of invisibility to harm others. The fact that I like being accountable for my actions would not allow me to act unjustly.

An aspect in this course that can explain why many people are likely to act in the same manner as the shepherd is an assertion by St. Augustine. He states that the nature of human beings is engrained on disregarding what is good even though there is freedom of making life choices (Stewart-Kroeker, 2017). Something that starts out with good intentions can be negated with ease due to how people are tuned by the environment.




Cholbi, M. (2016). Understanding Kant’s ethics. Cambridge University Press.

Ruggiero, V. R. (2012). Thinking critically about ethical issues (8th ed.). New York: Mc-Graw Hill.

Stewart-Kroeker, S. (2017). Pilgrimage as moral and aesthetic formation in Augustine’s thought. Oxford University Press.